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A Structural Analysis of the Physician- 
Patient Relationship in No-Code 
Decisionmaking 
When hospital personnel discover that a patient has suffered a cardi- 
opulmonary arrest,' they usually summon a team of doctors and nurses 
trained in advanced cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR).2 Physicians 
may, however, instruct personnel not to attempt resuscitation by assigning 
a "no-code order."3 
This Note criticizes current no-code decisionmaking and urges replac- 
ing it with a system based upon informed consent by the patient. An anal- 
ysis of the roles of the actors involved in the no-code system indicates that 
the patient is usually the most appropriate decisionmaker. Current efforts 
to reform hospital policies' or resort to third-party adjudications" unwisely 
limit patient control of the no-code decision. The Note proposes both that 
prolongation of life should remain a choice even for the terminally ill pa- 
tient and that no-code status should be an option for a competent patient 
who is not terminally ill. To maximize patient autonomy and self- 
determination for no-code decisionmaking, the Note recommends that the 
physician elicit an informed decision at the time of hospital admission and 
that the hospital formally monitor the implementation of that decision. 
1. Typically, a nurse discovers a patient whose breathing and heartbeat have stopped. Cardi- 
opulmonary resuscitation (CPR) must then begin immediately because anoxic brain damage generally 
occurs within three to five minutes. The nurse summons the advanced CPR team after she has begun 
basic CPR (artificial ventilation and external cardiac compression). See In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. 
App. Ct. 466, 468, 380 N.E.2d 134, 135 (1978); D. MEYERS, MEDICo-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
DEATH AND DYING 186-87 (1981). CPR did not gain widespread use until the 1960's. See DeBard, 
The History of Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation, 9 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 273 (1980). 
2. CPR consists of two types of techniques. Basic Life Support includes establishment of artificial 
respiratory ventilation by mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and artificial circulation by external cardiac 
compression. Advanced Life Support uses equipment and special techniques. See National Conference 
on Standards for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) and Emergency Cardiac Care (ECC), 244 J. 
A.M.A. 453, 460-71, 479-93 (1980) [hereinafter cited as National Conferencel. 
3. A "full code" or "complete code" instructs hospital staff to undertake a full-scale CPR effort if 
the patient has a cardiopulmonary arrest. A "no-code," "do-not-resuscitate," or "order not to resusci- 
tate" instructs the nursing staff not to summon the resuscitation team if that patient has a car- 
diopulmonary arrest. See In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 469 n.3, 380 N.E.2d 134, 136 n.3 
(1978) (describing recent development of coding systems in acute care hospitals). 
4. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND 
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING To FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 
9 (1982) (proposing uniform accreditation requirements concerning no-codes) [hereinafter cited as 
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT]. 
5. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 756-59, 
370 N.E.2d 417, 431-35 (1977) (requiring probate court review); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 49-50, 
355 A.2d 647, 668-69 (proposing hospital ethics committee), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
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I. CURRENT CPR MEDICAL PRACTICES AND INFORMED CONSENT 
The physician's discretion in assigning no-code status limits the influ- 
ence of a patient's desires. Courts do not currently require physicians to 
adhere strictly to the informed consent doctrine in making coding deci- 
sions, and their current reliance upon a physician's coding decisions re- 
sults in outcomes that reflect the physician's preferences" at the expense of 
the patient's rights to self-determination and participation.' 
A. Determining Coding Status 
No-code systems vary both among institutions and within a given hospi- 
tal,8 but physicians generally limit assignment of no-code status to termi- 
nally ill patients with an irreversible condition.9 In determining no-code 
status, physicians usually consult with the patient's family,'0 but rarely 
with the patient, even if he is competent.11 Because physicians do not us- 
6. See generally Eisenberg, Sociologic Influences on Decision-Making by Clinicians, 90 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 957 (1979) (physician's decisionmaking process influenced by factors intrinsic to 
own personality and by physician's reaction to patient's personal characteristics). 
7. See Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell-Somne Reflections on Humnan Dignity, Enltrapmnent, Inl- 
formed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 690-95 (1975) (arguing that, when con- 
sent not informed, a citizen's dignity may be harmed even if therapy is beneficial); cf Michelman, 
The Supremne Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights, 1973 DUKE L.J. 
1153, 1175 (participation significant in determinations of due process). 
8. See Note, No-Code Orders vs. Resuscitation: The Decision To Withhold Life-Prolonging Treat- 
melt Fromn the Termninally III, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 139, 143 n.21 (1979) (discussing varying medical 
practices). 
9. One court has specifically ruled that assignment of no-code status in this category of patients is 
a discretionary decision by the physician. See In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 475, 380 
N.E.2d 134, 139 (1978) (no-code decision within competence of medical profession). 
10. See id. (decision to code within physician's discretion in light of, inter alil, family's wishes); 
National Conference, suI)ra note 2, at 507 (recommending assignment of no-code after discussion with 
patient's family). But see J. ROBERTSON, THE RIGHTS OF THE CRITICALLY ILI 74 (1983) (some 
doctors do not inform families of no-code orders). 
11. See J. ROBERTSON, supra note 10, at 77 (some physicians view obtaining competent patients' 
consent for no-code orders as violation of standards of care). Studies demonstrate that over 80% of 
physicians do not even discuss the threshold issue of terminal prognoses with their patients. See 
Veatch, When Should the Patient Knoui? When Should He Be Kept in the Dark?, 1981 BARRISTER 6S, 
6. Physicians may honor a terminally ill patient's unsolicited request for a no-code status. Without 
active inquiry by the physician, however, such a patient request is unlikely because of the anxiety and 
ignorance of most patients. See J. ROBERTSON, supra note 10, at 77 (patient extremely unlikely to 
inquire of own accord); cf Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir.) (noting informed 
consent requires affirmative physician duty of disclosure because few patients could otherwise ask 
cogent questions), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). A fully coded terminally ill patient may receive 
CPR without his prior consent or the consent of his family. Because physicians treat all silent non- 
terminally ill patients as fully coded, these patients almost always receive CPR without prior consent. 
See Guidelines for Do Not Resuscitate Orders, Northwestern Memnorial Hospital, Chicago, in LEGAL 
AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS 303 (1982) (all 
patients not designated "no-code" treated as "full-code") [hereinafter cited as LEGAL AND ETHICAL 
ASPECTS]; Van Scoy-Mosher, Anz Oncologist's Case for No-Code Orders, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL 
ASPECTS, supra, at 16 (noting full code is automatic and does not require an order). Physicians can 
choose not to honor an unsolicited no-code request by a non-terminally ill patient. See, e.g., R. BURT, 
TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS 1-6 (1979) (describing David G., a severe burn victim, whom physi- 
cians refused to no-code despite his personal pleas and his poor initial prognosis); D. CRANE, THE 
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ually assign no-code status until a patient is near death, patient participa- 
tion is often impracticable. By that time, the patient's incompetence may 
obviate obtaining patient consent.12 
B. Legal Constraints on Coding Decisions 
Although medical discretion in determining coding status is ostensibly 
constrained by the doctrine of informed consent, courts fail to demand 
strict informed consent requirements, and other tort causes of action are 
ineffective. 
1. Informed Consent 
Over the past twenty-five years, courts have established a qualified re- 
quirement18 that physicians inform their patients about the nature and 
risks of proposed therapies and available alternatives." Despite the recent 
expansion of the informed consent doctrine to a wide range of medical 
interventions,1 the courts do not enforce strict informed consent require- 
ments in no-code decisionmaking. This reluctance stems from a judicial 
misperception that there are no patient choices involved in no-coding and 
that informed consent is impracticable for CPR procedures contingent 
upon an unpredictable future event. In the leading decision on no-code 
SANCTITY OF SOCIAL LIFE: PHYSICIANS' TREATMENT OF CRITICALLY ILL PATIENTS 82 (1978) 
(describing incident in which resuscitation of 80-year-old retired nurse against her will generated 
conflict between nurses and medical staff). 
12. See J. ROBERTSON, supra note 10, at 77 (patient likely to be incompetent when no-code 
decision made). Almost all patients become incompetent at some time before a cardiopulmonary arrest. 
A physician at the scene of a cardiopulmonary arrest may exercise medical judgment to determine the 
intensity of the CPR effort. See AMERICAN HEART ASS'N, TEXTBOOK OF ADVANCED CARDIAC LIFE 
SUPPORT at xviII-4 to XVIII-8 (1981). For example, one physician has advocated giving only five- 
minute resuscitation attempts to all patients more than 65 years old. See Baer, Cardiopulmonary 
Resuscitation After Age 65, 43 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 1065 (1979) (letter to the editors). 
13. There are two major exceptions to the requirement of informed consent. The "therapeutic 
privilege" allows a physician to withhold a diagnosis from his patient when disclosure would seriously 
jeopardize the recovery of an unstable patient. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406, 350 P.2d 1093, 
1103 (1960). The "emergency exception" allows a physician to proceed with treatment when the 
patient is incapable of consenting and the harm from a failure to treat exceeds possible harm from the 
proposed treatment. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788-89; Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940, 941-42 
(3d Cir. 1970). An attempt should still be made to secure a relative's consent if possible, but the 
physician may proceed with treatment if immediate care is required. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789. 
14. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783-84 (D.C. Cir.) (announcing standard of 
disclosure independent of prevailing professional standards), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Salgo 
v. Leland Stanford, Jr., Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957) 
(requiring disclosure of all facts necessary to form basis of informed consent); Natanson v. Kline, 186 
Kan. 393, 410, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106-07 (1960) (requiring disclosure of nature of disease and pro- 
posed treatment, risks, probability of success, and availability of alternatives). 
15. See, e.g., Truman v. Thomas, 93 Cal. App. 3d 304, 155 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1979) (pap smear); 
Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr., Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957) 
(diagnostic radiology); Whitfield v. Daniel Const., 226 S.C. 37, 83 S.E.2d 460 (1954) (drug therapy). 
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decisionmaking,1I the court deferred to the expertise of the medical profes- 
sion under the assumption that assigning a no-code decision involves no 
discretion17 unless there is some hope of restoring the terminally ill pa- 
tient to a normal cognitive existence."8 Honoring a patient's wish for he- 
roic medical intervention, such as CPR, would recognize the intrinsic 
value of autonomous patient decisionmaking that should outweigh any ef- 
fect on the patient's prognosis. 
Courts have not required informed consent in emergencies", or in situa- 
tions in which patients may become greatly distressed as a result of the 
disclosures necessary for informed consent.20 Although CPR arguably falls 
within this emergency exception,21 determining the coding status soon af- 
ter a patient enters the hospital would increase the time available for de- 
liberation and thus minimize the need to invoke the emergency excep- 
tion. 2 Courts should therefore limit the emergency exception for a CPR 
treatment decision to cases in which CPR must begin before the patient 
sees a physician. 
16. In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 475, 380 N.E.2d 134, 139 (1978). 
17. Id. at 474-75, 380 N.E.2d at 138-39. 
18. Id. at 466-67, 380 N.E.2d at 134-35. 
19. See, e.g., Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940, 941-42 (3d Cir. 1970) (thyroid surgery for 
hyperthyroidism); Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 133, 136 N.W. 1106, 1110 (1912) (foot amputa- 
tion for infection); Crouch v. Most, 78 N.M. 406, 410, 432 P.2d 250, 254 (1967) (antivenom for 
rattlesnake bite). 
20. See, e.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr., Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 
317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957) (radiological study of the aorta); Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 
415-16, 227 N.E.2d 296, 300, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373, 379-80 (App. Div. 1967) (spinal fusion); Starnes v. 
Taylor, 272 N.C. 386, 393, 158 S.E.2d 339, 344 (1968) (diagnostic study of the esophagus). 
21. The "emergency exception" to the doctrine of informed consent suspends the consent require- 
ment when a patient is unconscious or otherwise unable to comprehend what is being said to him and 
when the imminent harm from a failure to treat outweighs the possible harm from the treatment. 
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). 
22. In cases of imminent danger to the patient, judicial decisions vary as to whether a patient has 
a right to refuse treatment. Compare Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125, 129-30 (N.D. 
Ill. 1972) (allowing Jehovah's Witness to refuse transfusion) and In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 
361, 372-74, 205 N.E.2d 435, 441-42 (1965) (same) with United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 
753-54 (D. Conn. 1965) (Jehovah's Witness given transfusion when she would not actively resist 
court action) and Ex rel. President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1009 (D.C. 
Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). Where therapy is likely to be successful and non- 
treatment will probably be fatal, the ultimate issue becomes whether refusal of therapy constitutes 
suicide. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 743 n.1 1, 370 
N.E.2d 417, 426 n.11 (1977). Performing CPR does not, however, usually prevent death. See infra 
note 51 (low survival-to-hospital-discharge rate). Furthermore, there is a distinction between active 
intervention to cause death and passive refusal to intrude without permission upon a clinically dead 
patient. See P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON 146-51 (1970) (noting passive euthanasia empha- 
sizes caring for needs of dying, not hastening death). 
23. When CPR is begun outside the hospital before the patient is seen by a physician, neurologi- 
cal signs other than consciousness do not correlate with long-term outcome. See Earnest, Yarnell, 
Merrill & Knapp, Long-term Sunrival and Neurologic Status After Resuscitation from Out-of- 
Hospital Cardiac Arrest, 30 NEUROLOGY 1298, 1302 (1980). Without either patient consent or pre- 
dictive criteria for recovery available, clinicians must act on the assumption that a life may be saved by 
continuing resuscitation efforts. 
365 
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 93: 362, 1983 
Courts should also be wary of a physician's claim of "therapeutic privi- 
lege"-that disclosing information necessary to give an informed consent 
would significantly harm the patient.94 Courts must narrowly interpret 
this privilege if they are not to defeat the very purposes of informed con- 
sent, although patient anxiety associated with the dialogue concerning no- 
coding may be significantly If honest dialogues about the foreseeable like- 
lihood of a cardiopulmonary arrest were routine, however, patients would 
come to expect to have such conversations" and would therefore suffer 
less anxiety from them. Courts should restrict the therapeutic privilege to 
the relatively rare circumstance where disclosing the required information 
would significantly harm the patient. 
2. Traditional Tort Remedies 
In theory, courts may impose tort liability upon the negligent physician 
for failure to attempt resuscitation, for improper resuscitation, or for re- 
suscitation against a patient's will. A negligent failure to attempt resusci- 
tation may subject a physician to liability for wrongful death.98 If the 
physician improperly terminates the professional relationship with the pa- 
24. See Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. 
L. REV. 340, 387-92 (1974); Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a 
Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 413, 460-61 
(1979). 
25. Some physicians resisted the traditional informed consent requirements on the ground that 
patients generally do not want to know about their diagnoses and tests. See, e.g., Kaplan, Greenwald 
& Rogers, Neglected Aspects of Informed Consent, 296 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1127 (1977) (arguing that 
informed consent contributes to morbidity and mortality rates of procedures); Silk, A Physician's Plea: 
Recognize Limnitations of Informed Consent, Am. Med. News, Apr. 12, 1976, at 19, col. I (noting 
informed consent contributes to patient avoidance of surgery for curable brain tumor). Other physi- 
cians believe that the patient's lack of choice leads to avoidance of treatment. See, e.g., Crile, Manage- 
ment of Breast Cancer: Limited Mastectomny, 230 J. A.M.A. 95, 95-96 (1974) (maintaining that fear 
of radical mastectomy is greatest cause of delay in treatment of breast cancer). 
26. See S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 241-46 (1979) (inform- 
ative conversation that dispels fears more therapeutic than relying upon blind faith); PRESIDENT'S 
COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAV- 
IORAL RESEARCH, I MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 96 (1982) 
(documentation for claims of dangerous effects of informed consent sparse and anecdotal) [hereinafter 
cited as MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS]. Furthermore, providing information reduces stress and 
speeds recovery from surgery. See MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra, at 100-01 (fewer in- 
hospital recovery days and less medication required for surgical patients who were given more infor- 
mation about surgery). 
27. The primary physician should document the reasons for believing that the patient would be 
harmed by disclosure, as well as the likelihood of the particular type of harm. If a therapeutic excep- 
tion is necessary, the physician should also obtain informed consent from the patient's family. See 
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir.) (recommending physician disclosure to close 
relative if therapeutic privilege invoked), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). 
28. See, e.g., Kern v. Kogan, 93 N.J. Super. 459, 465-66, 226 A.2d 186, 189-90 (1967) (noting 
statutory provision allowing recovery by kin for wrongful death); Jones v. City of New York, 57 
A.D.2d 429, 430, 395 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (allowing award for wrongful death because 
of inadequate respirator care). 
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tient, abandonment creates a separate basis of liability.29 A battery occurs 
if the physician resuscitates the patient against expressed wishes.30 
Despite the widespread use of CPR techniques and coding systems 
since the early 1960's,81 no plaintiff has asserted any of these tort reme- 
dies in the context of CPR,32 an unsurprising situation given the ineffec- 
tiveness of such remedies in increasing patient participation in coding de- 
cisions. Patients generally know little about coding systems or CPR 
technologies and thus cannot assert their rights to self-determination. 
Moreover, physicians sometimes resort to subterfuges, such as unwritten 
or erasable coding systems,33 to minimize any tort liability. Disagreements 
between physicians and patients may not become apparent if the physician 
need not obtain informed consent for the assignment of a code.34 More- 
over, obtaining family approval for a no-code assignment, instead of direct 
consent from the patient, may effectively immunize the physician from 
liability if the patient dies.8" Physicians may also be shielded from liability 
by community medical standards that allow nondisclosure 3 and minimal 
29. See, e.g., Leesburg Hosp. Ass'n v. Carter, 321 So. 2d 433, 433 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (abandonment alleged for failure of nurses to summon physician for heart attack victim); Levy v. 
Kirk, 187 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (noting that abandonment occurred when physi- 
cian failed to see patient after hospital admission). Because abandonment is a breach of contract, no 
expert testimony is required to establish a community standard of practice. By contrast, expert testi- 
mony is typically required in a claim of medical negligence. See Alexandridis v. Jewett, 388 F.2d 829, 
833 (1st Cir. 1968) (distinguishing abandonment from negligence). 
30. The patient may allege battery in a medical procedure if the physician did not obtain in- 
formed consent. See, e.g., Belcher v. Carter, 13 Ohio App. 2d 113, 114, 234 N.E.2d 311, 312 (1967) (radiation treatments); Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 155, 223 A.2d 663, 669 (1966) (spinal 
operation). 
31. See AMERICAN HEART AssWN, supra note 12, at vii. 
32. Only three court cases to date have directly upheld coding assignments, and all involved in- 
stances in which plaintiffs sought to obtain a no-code status for incompetent patients. See Severns v. 
Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334, 1349 (Del. 1980) (ordering court hearing on requests 
for no-code order and respirator removal by spouse of comatose patient); In re Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 
701, 434 N.E.2d 601, 608 (1982) (allowing physicians to obtain no-code order for abandoned new- 
born); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 469-70, 380 N.E.2d 134, 136 (1978) (granting son's, 
daughter's, and physicians' requests for no-code order on elderly comatose patient). 
33. See Le Blang, Does Your Hospital Have A Policy For No-Code Orders?, 9 LEGAL ASPECTS 
MED. PRACTICE 1, 1 (1981) (acknowledging existence in hospitals of informal coding systems); Mur- 
phy, Nurses and Nontrealnent Decisions, in DILEMMAS OF DYING: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR 
DECISIONS NOT TO TREAT 48 (1981) (nurses may be told to delay notifying physicians if patient has 
cardiac arrest) [hereinafter cited as DILEMMAS OF DYING]; Van Scoy-Mosher, supra note 11, at 15 
(describing use of erasable and "whispered" no-code orders). 
34. See infra notes 52 & 53 (physicians may simply tell patients that procedures will be per- 
formed, instead of asking for consent). 
35. If assigning the no-code was a potentially criminal act, the family may be reluctant to publi- 
cize its complicity. See Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 
27 STAN. L. REV. 213, 243 (1975). 
36. See supra notes 11 & 12 (little disclosure to patient in most instances). If community disclo- 
sure standards are unclear or do not require informed consent, physicians have a practical defense 
against lawsuits. Cf. Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So. 2d 226, 228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (affirming 
dismissal of claim because plaintiff offered no evidence on community practice of disclosure); Ross v. 
Hodges, 234 So. 2d 905, 909 (Miss. 1970) (minimal disclosure by neurosurgeon met community 
standards). But see Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 785 (D.C. Cir.) (replacing medical commu- 
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treatments.87 Finally, defendants may successfully argue that failure to 
resuscitate cannot be the proximate cause of death of a patient whose 
heart and lung functions have stopped.88 
The battery remedy similarly possesses only limited effectiveness. With- 
holding medical treatment does not constitute battery because there is no 
nonconsensual contact.8' Because patients usually die despite the un- 
wanted invasion of CPR,40 they cannot bring suit, and the family may not 
know of any wrongs or may be too aggrieved to pursue legal action. Most 
importantly, juries and judges may be unsympathetic to claims arising 
from heroic actions undertaken by medical personnel to save a life even if 
taken against the expressed wishes of a dying patient or his family.4 
C. Deleterious Results from Current Practice 
Both the resuscitation of a patient who does not desire heroic efforts 
and the failure to resuscitate a patient who does desire such efforts violate 
the individual's autonomy. This violation of human dignity is particularly 
significant because of the life-or-death consequences of the coding choice.41 
Moreover, the scope of this violation of individual autonomy is likely to 
increase substantially in the future as CPR techniques become more elab- 
orate and hospitals install more advanced physiological monitoring sys- 
nity standard of negligence with judge-made standard), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). 
37. See, e.g., supra note 12 (five-minute resuscitation attempts on elderly patients). Non- 
resuscitation for terminally ill patients is considered routine care. 
38. Cf. A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 376 (1978) (no liability if no causal link 
exists between termination of care and subsequent injury). Damage awards are generally smaller the 
worse the patient's condition at the time of malpractice. See, e.g., Jones v. City of New York, 57 
A.D.2d 429, 431, 395 N.Y.S.2d 10, 12 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (reducing wrongful death damages award 
because survival of decedent would have been brief); Dunham v. Village of Canisteo, 303 N.Y. 498, 
505, 104 N.E.2d 872, 876 (Ct. App. 1952) (noting reduced wrongful death damages if malpractice 
only hastened death). Since most patients receiving CPR have a poor prognosis, damage awards 
would thus probably be insufficient deterrents. 
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ? 14 (1965) (noting necessity of act of contact for 
battery). 
40. See infra note 51 (noting low survival-to-hospital-discharge rate). 
41. This is a type of "wrongful life" claim which courts have often rejected. See, e.g., Gleitman v. 
Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 31, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967) (rejecting wrongful life claims by parents and 
deformed child, because of public policy favoring right to live, despite physicians' negligent failure to 
warn of birth defect dangers); Williams v. New York, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 482-83, 223 N.E.2d 343, 
343-44, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, 886-87 (Ct. App. 1966) (refusing cause of action for wrongful birth by 
infant against state for negligent failure to prevent sexual assault on mother in state mental institu- 
tion); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 518-19, 219 N.W.2d 242, 244-45 (1974) 
(rejecting wrongful life claim for failure of clinic and physician to determine pregnancy in time for 
legal abortion). 
42. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 742, 370 
N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977) (stating that value of life lessened by failure to allow right to decline medical 
treatment); In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 448, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 531 (1980) (warning about danger 
of technology controlled by strangers who determine definition of death), modified sub nom. Eichner 
v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981). 
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tems.48 Because most Americans die in a hospital or nursing home rather 
than in their home,44 CPR practice potentially affects a large number of 
citizens. 
Assigning a patient a no-code status without obtaining his approval 
may amount to ending a human life without consent,45 an egregious 
wrong when that life may be prolonged at small expense. Such paternal- 
ism also denies the individual the opportunity to come to terms emotion- 
ally and spiritually with death and dying.47 The no-code decision involves 
true choices, because modern medicine may prolong life in nearly all in- 
stances, albeit sometimes with little hope of long-term survival. A no-code 
determination also intrinsically involves non-medical considerations. A 
physician's determination of no-codes may therefore result in an imposi- 
tion of the physician's values that is both inconsistent with patient prefer- 
ences and unjustified by technical expertise. Under the current system, for 
example, the likelihood of receiving no-code status increases for those di- 
vorced, nonambulatory, or incontinent.48 
The automatic initiation of CPR efforts on all patients who are not no- 
coded, by contrast, violates human dignity and the right to bodily integrity 
of those who do not desire resuscitation. CPR may involve electric shock, 
intubation with artificial respiratory ventilation, and even open-chest in- 
43. See Coskey, Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation: Impact on Hospital Mortality-A Ten-Year 
Study, 129 W.J. MED. 511, 515 (1978) (optimal in theory to monitor every hospital patient); Van 
Scoy-Mosher, supra note 11, at 14 (noting tendency in medicine to apply new technology indiscrimi- 
nately when available). 
44. See S. BOK, supra note 26, at 244 (more than 80% of Americans die in hospitals or other 
institutions); J. ROBERTSON, supra note 10, at 154 (most Americans die in hospitals). 
45. See In re Storar, 78 A.D.2d 1013, 1013, 434 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47 (1980) (Cardone, J., dissenting) 
(noting that depriving individual of compromised life remains a denial of all rights), rev'd, 52 N.Y.2d 
363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981). 
46. See Hahn, Hutchinson & Conte, Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation in a University Hospi- 
tal-An Analysis of Sunrival and Cost, 131 W.J. MED. 344, 344 (1979) (average cost of resuscitation 
effort is 5366). 
47. See P. RAMSEY, supra note 22, at 237-38 (advocating cultural recovery of a religious sense 
that death not always an evil). 
48. See Patient Often is Uninvolved in 'No-Code' Choice, Internal Med. News, May 1-14, 1982, 
at 45, col. 1. Another study demonstrated that there were greater numbers of resuscitation attempts on 
all patients at the beginning of the academic year compared with the end of the year, perhaps because 
of the need for the physician-in-training to acquire and improve upon technical resuscitation skills. 
See D. CRANE, supra note 11, at 80-81. Crane concludes that a physician was less likely to resusci- 
tate the aged because the physician equated advanced age with a decline in social capacity. See id. at 
61. Sudnow states that the aged are more frequently pronounced dead after a cursory examination, 
and noted that alcoholics, prostitutes, drug addicts, and vagrants received less active resuscitation ef- 
forts. See D. SUDNOW, PASSING ON: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF DYING 104-05 (1967). 
49. See Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 166 (1905) (noting right to inviolability of body), aff'd, 
224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 
Mass. 728, 738-39, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977) (noting right to freedom from nonconsensual inva- 
sion of bodily integrity); In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 459, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 539 (1980) (noting 
patient's inherent right to prevent cruel prolongation of dying), modified sub norn. Eichner v. Dillon, 
52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981). 
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ternal cardiac compression.50 Chronically ill patients, who dominate hos- 
pital populations, may not wish to undergo CPR measures knowing that 
even if CPR is "successful," they have little chance of surviving until hos- 
pital discharge." 
Even physicians who obtain their patients' consent to a coding status 
need not follow defined requirements that would adequately inform the 
patient about the nature of CPR procedures, their attendant risks, and the 
alternative treatments.52 An uninformed consent does not recognize the 
value of individual dignity implicit in autonomous choicemaking and may 
merely amount to coerced assent."" Patients given the opportunity to agree 
to full-code status without full information may live to regret the 
outcome.5 
II. A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE NO-CODE DECISION 
In contrast to the usual treatment of medical decisionmaking as a 
fiduciary relationship between doctor and patient, this Note adopts a 
structural analysis which considers the suitability for making the no-code 
decision of each major actor in the process and criticizes currently availa- 
ble alternatives from a procedural standpoint. 
Courts currently rely upon the fiduciary doctrine as a structural 
description of the physician-patient relationship Unfortunately, courts 
50. See In re Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 702, 434 N.E.2d 601, 604-05 (1982) (noting CPR side- 
effects include further weakened condition, pain, neurologic and liver damage); In re Dinnerstein, 6 
Mass. App. Ct. 466, 468-69, 380 N.E.2d 134, 135-36 (1978) (noting violence and pain intrinsic to 
CPR). 
51. See Coskey, supra note 43, at 512 (17% of those receiving CPR survive to hospital discharge); 
DeBard, Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation: An Analysis of Six Years' Experience and Review of the 
Literature, 10 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 404, 408 (1981) (24% rate); Hahn, Hutchinson & Conte, 
supra note 46, at 344 (19% rate); Lemire & Johnson, Is Cardiac Resuscitation Worthwhile? A De- 
cade of Experience, 286 NEW ENG. J. MED. 970, 970 (1972) (19% rate). 
52. Even those university hospitals which require "informed consent" from the competent patient 
before assigning no-code status often fail to define what information physicians should divulge. Yale- 
New Haven Hospital's Do Not Resuscitate Policy, for example, merely recognizes that when physi- 
cians initiate conversations about no-coding, they rarely obtain informed consent. Instead, the physi- 
cian ordinarily tells the patient or family that "there is no reasonable chance of medical reversibility" 
and asks for "authorization" to assign a no-code status. See Levine, Do Not Resuscitate Orders and 
Their Implementation, in DILEMMAS OF DYING, supra note 33, 23, 36-37. 
53. See I. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 121-24 (1969) (defining negative freedom from 
deliberate interference within area of personal autonomy). But cf. Spencer, "Code" or "No Code": A 
Nonlegal Opinion, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 138, 139 (1979) (physician advocating that family mem- 
bers be told why physician will not attempt resuscitation, instead of asking family whether or not they 
want physician to attempt it). 
54. See FUsgen & Summa, How Much Sense Is There in an Attempt to Resuscitate an Aged 
Person?, 24 GERONTOLOGY 37, 39-42 (1978) (noting that of an original total of 239 elderly patients 
who underwent an attempted resuscitation, seven of nine survivors at six months beyond hospital 
discharge would not agree to another resuscitation, while remaining two patients had no opinion). 
55. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 400, 350 P.2d 1093, 1099 (1960) (noting fiduci- 
ary relationship requires physician disclosure); Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wash. App. 298, 308, 474 P.2d 
909, 916 (1970) (noting fiduciary duty to inform). The court in Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 
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ignore the inherent tension between the fiduciary as the ultimate deci- 
sionmaker and the patient's right to self-determination." In informed con- 
sent cases, courts tend to balance values,57 and the patient's choice often 
loses out to the preferences of others." 
The participants' relative positions and incentives in no-code decision- 
making determine their most effective functions. This relational structure 
takes into account the increasing emphasis upon patient participation and 
self-determination in contemporary physician-patient relations.59 
A. The Patient 
The patient is usually in the best position to evaluate his human 
needs.60 He can best assess his present physical and emotional pain in 
781 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972), grafted the fiduciary's duty of disclosure onto the 
physician's duty of care under tort negligence principles. 
56. The fiduciary relationship assumes a single stereotyped relationship with an incompetent ben- 
eficiary. It is thus clearly incompatible with the notion of autonomy and self-determination. 
57. Courts commonly balance individual interests against state interests in determining whether 
the state should require treatment. See, e.g., In re Spring, 80 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1209, 1220, 405 N.E.2d 
115, 123 (1980) (balancing incompetent patient's interest in quality of life versus state interest in 
preservation of life); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 
744-45, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427 (1977) (weighing state interest in preservation of life against individ- 
ual's freedom to reject intrusions upon privacy and bodily integrity). 
58. The traditional judicial weighing of values lends itself to result-oriented decisions with cate- 
gorical rules. In the case of no-code decisionmaking, such reasoning leads to a particularly difficult 
choice: Courts must balance the sanctity of life and the patient's autonomy. In the individual case, the 
emotional, economic, and physical costs of resuscitation may become so overwhelming that to maintain 
a strict requirement of resuscitation would itself question the "sanctity of life" value by highlighting 
other dissonant values, such as human dignity. The analysis creates potential tragedy for the termi- 
nally ill patient who, if allowed to choose, may wish to have life even momentarily prolonged to see 
the fulfillment of an important life event. In addition, the technological environment upon which 
courts base their categorical decisions changes constantly, creating the danger of rapid obsolescence of 
court-determined cost-benefit calculations. Cf G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF 
STATUTES 73 (1982) (commenting on obsolescence of statutes caused by rapid technological changes 
and difficulties of legislatures in updating these laws). Finally, by concentrating on a result-oriented 
analysis, courts ignore the independent value of patient participation in the decisionmaking process. 
Cf Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 283-89 (1975) (noting that 
structural due process involves participation of individuals in hearings, apart from the mere applica- 
tion of substantive rules). 
59. Compare Kushmer, Doctor-Patient Relationships in General Practice-A Different Model, 7 
J. MED. ETHICS 128, 128 (1981) (variety of physician-patient models, including patient participation 
model, depending on the peculiar situation) and Szasz & Hollender, A Contribution to the Philosophy 
of Medicine: The Basic Models of the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 97 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 
585, 585 (1956) (patient participation model) with T. PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 433-54, 
463-65 (1951) (traditional model with authoritarian physician and compliant patient). 
60. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972) 
(weight given to patient's subjective fears and hopes in evaluating medical risks is a nonmedical judg- 
ment reserved to patient); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 
747, 370 N.E.2d 417, 428 (1977) (describing importance of viewing situational complexities from 
patient's unique perspective); cf. R. DuBoS, MIRAGE OF HEALTH: UTOPIAS, PROGRESS, AND BIO- 
LOGICAL CHANGE 261 (1979) (disease best measured by individual's ability to function in manner 
acceptable to himself and not in terms of medical attributes). Furthermore, threatened imposition of 
intrusive medical technologies may interfere with a patient's psychological ability to come to terms 
with dying by raising false hopes. See J. WOJCIK, MUTED CONSENT 113 (1978). 
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formulating a decision whether to prolong his life.6" Furthermore, in eval- 
uating economic costs, the patient is free from the conflict of interests that 
beset the family,62 the hospital, or even the state." Focusing on a pa- 
tient's desires also avoids difficult evaluations of the patient's social wor- 
thiness.66 The decision most directly affects the life of the patient, and he 
should have responsibility for that decision. 
B. The Physician 
The physician is best able to determine the viability of the patient and 
the likelihood of recovery in case of a cardiopulmonary arrest. A decision 
to no-code a patient is not simply a medical decision, however. Economic" 
and moral7 concerns also deserve consideration. The person most affected 
by the decision can most adequately assess these factors. Furthermore, 
physicians left to their own means might consider characteristics of pa- 
tients that may not be acceptable to the patient or society.68 The conscien- 
61. Physicians have difficulty in effectively alleviating the pain of dying patients. See MD's Urged 
To Alter Prescribing Patternsfor Dying Cancer Patients in Pain, Am. Med. News, Feb. 18, 1983, at 
2, col. I (citing study that three-quarters of dying patients receiving pain medications continue to 
experience moderate to severe distress). 
62. See, e.g., In re Spring, 80 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1209, 1220 n.3, 405 N.E.2d 115, 122 n.3 (1980) 
(questioning reliability of decision by ward's wife because of admitted influence of financial cost of 
nursing home on treatment choice); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 370 n.2, 390, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 269 
n.2, 279 (1980) (danger of potential abuses of power by a family member). 
63. See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 390, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 279 (1981) (Jones, J., dissenting in 
part) (extraordinary medical procedures often involve economic cost that may affect hospital's incen- 
tive to institute or continue such care). 
Physicians may also have financial conflicts of interest in a particular case. Two Los Angeles physi- 
cians were criminally prosecuted for unplugging a comatose patient's respirator and passively al- 
lowing him to die without nutrition. The prosecution alleged that the doctors sought to hide a poten- 
tial malpractice problem that occurred after abdominal surgery which resulted in coma. See Did the 
Patient Die-Or Was He Murdered?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 14, 1983, at 76. The municipal court judge 
dismissed the charges and noted his reluctance to intervene in a complex medical situation. See Life 
and Death and the Law, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 21, 1983, at 52. 
64. For example, if Veterans Administration physicians committed a potential malpractice that 
resulted in a patient's becoming terminally ill, there would be a conflict of interest if the physicians, as 
government employees, decided to no-code the patient. 
65. Cf. In re Spring, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 831, 839, 399 N.E.2d 493, 498 (1979) (value of life should 
not relate to intelligence or social status), rev'd on other grounds, 80 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1209, 405 
N.E.2d 115 (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 753, 
370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (1977) (decision whether to prolong life should not depend on intelligence or 
social status). But cf. id. at 754, 370 N.E.2d at 432 (1977) (noting that patient's expected pain and 
disorientation may justify withholding of medical treatment). 
66. See P. RAMSEY, supra note 22, at 139 (noting that economic costs, while not turning ethics 
into a monetary science, do affect the values involved in terminal illness and treatments given). 
67. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 33-34, 355 A.2d 647, 660 (guardian's Catholic moral 
viewpoint important in medical decision), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 
431, 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 526 (1980) (noting that priest-patient accepted Pope's teachings regard- 
ing withdrawal of life support), modified sub nom. Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 
438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981). 
68. See supra note 48 (patient characteristics including marital status, ambulatory status, and 
perceived moral character affect physicians' decisions). 
There are, of course, some disadvantages for the physician in adopting an informed consent stan- 
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tious physician may feel more secure in an explicitly stated system of cod- 
ing and feel more comfortable without the burdens of making crucial non- 
medical decisions for patients. 
C. The Patient's Family 
Although it is currently common practice to obtain permission to no- 
code a patient from a patient's family,9 the family is not necessarily in a 
better position than the patient to evaluate the patient's desire to live.70 A 
patient's family is, however, useful in determining what an incompetent 
patient's desires are or what these desires were prior to incompetency.71 
The family is also in a better position than the patient to seek legal sanc- 
tions for perceived unfairness in the assignment of the no-code status. 
D. The State 
The state has an important interest in promoting the preservation of 
life.72 Since life-saving technologies are available, albeit sometimes only at 
great cost, this norm may seem compromised by any procedural system 
allowing patients to die without attempting to prolong their lives. The 
state's interest in the preservation of life, however, diminishes in decisions 
involving utilization of invasive technologies on patients already on the 
dard. Physicians do not enjoy confronting a patient with questions concerning no-coding or statements 
describing the patient's terminal condition. They also face additional administrative burdens from 
documenting the disclosures and consents, and from approaching third-party decisionmakers for fur- 
ther adjudication of controversial issues. The physician may feel threatened by the possibility of law- 
suits resulting from standards subject to judicial change; violation of a clearly stated standard could 
bring civil or even criminal penalties. See 'Do-Not-Resuscitate' Guidelines Issued, Am. Med. News, 
Oct. 1, 1982, at 13, col. 1. They may be of some use in providing a "community standard" for 
malpractice decisions, however. See supra pp. 367-68. 
69. See In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 475, 380 N.E.2d 134, 139 (1978) (noting that 
no-coding decision is within competence of physician taking into account patient's history, condition, 
and family wishes). 
70. See Van Scoy-Mosher, supra note 11, at 15 (noting physicians may prolong dying of cancer 
patients to satisfy family's need to feel physician has employed all possible medical means to save 
patient). Also, in an extreme case, the patient's family may have either deserted the patient or be 
unavailable. See, e.g., In re Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 698, 434 N.E.2d 601, 602 (1982) (parents aban- 
doned child patient); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 284, 383 A.2d 785, 786 (Morris 
County Ct. 1978) (divorced, semi-reclusive patient without family support). 
71. See, e.g., In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 158 (Del. Ch. 1980) (husband asserting wife's previ- 
ously expressed wish to die a natural death); In re Spring, 8 Mass. App. 831, 840, 399 N.E.2d 493, 
499 (1979) (wife and son part of close knit family with patient), rev'd on other grounds, 80 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 1209, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); In re Storar, 106 Misc. 2d 880, 885, 433 N.Y.S.2d 388, 393 
(Sup. Ct.) (patient's mother empathetic to his needs), aff'd, 78 A.D.2d 1013, 434 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1980), 
rev'd on other grounds, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981). 
72. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (state's interest in preserving life becomes compel- 
ling at the time of fetal viability); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 19, 355 A.2d 647, 651-52 (state interest 
in preserving life has constitutional basis), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Eichner, 73 
A.D.2d 431, 450, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 533 (1980) (strong public policy to value and protect sanctity of 
life), modified sub noin. Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981). 
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brink of death." Moreover, the state's interest in preserving life may con- 
flict with certain fundamental values, including the right to bodily integ- 
rity,74 self-determination," and privacy.7 These rights, unlike the state's 
interest in preserving life, remain in force even when the death of the 
individual is certain. The right to bodily integrity is fundamental and may 
be breached only in certain defined circumstances.77 Violations of bodily 
integrity are often allowed only following an informed consent.78 A com- 
plete CPR attempt requires extremely invasive procedures, yet an indivi- 
dual may cherish privacy in the final moments of life.79 
73. See In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 159 (Del. Ch. 1980) (value of life diminishes if no hope of 
recovery); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (holding that state interest in life weak- 
ens as prognosis dims), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 465-66, 426 
N.Y.S.2d 517, 543 (1980) (maintaining that patient's lack of health lessens state interest in protection 
of life), mnodified sub noun. Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981); cf. In re 
Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 290, 383 A.2d 785, 789 (Morris County Ct. 1978) (holding that 
regardless of prognosis, individual's right of privacy against coerced leg amputation overcomes state 
interest in protection of life). 
The avoidance of "passive euthanasia" for nonterminally ill patients is another instance in which 
the state seeks to preserve human life. Such a policy ignores the tragedy of the present acceptance of 
passive euthanasia for terminally ill patients who may desperately desire to live. Moreover, prolonging 
the agonies of patients who want to die does not pay homage to the sanctity of life. The present 
system both expends scarce medical resources upon those who may not want to live, see supra note 54 
(describing results of resuscitation without patient permission), and denies life-saving treatment to 
those who may desire to be saved. The unnecessary denial of resuscitation may be due to either the 
failure to obtain direct patient consent, see supra note 11, or the expenditure of finite medical re- 
sources that could be spent on saving the lives of those who intensely desire to be saved, see G. 
CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 189 (1978) (observing that a system that offers "kid- 
neys for everyone" prices these patients' lives exceedingly high compared to the lives of other patients 
who, for similar expenditures, could also have been saved). 
74. See, e.g., Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 166 (1905) (right to inviolability of body), aff'd, 
224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 
Mass. 728, 739, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977) (right to freedom from nonconsensual invasion of bodily 
integrity). 
75. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.) (fundamental right to deter- 
mine what is done with own body), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 
229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513 (1972) (right to determine submission to treatment); 
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (adult's right 
to determine what shall be done with own body). 
76. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (noting that woman's decision regarding abortion 
is protected by fundamental right of privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) 
(zone of privacy protects distribution of contraceptives); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. 
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977) (describing constitutional right of pri- 
vacy in penumbra of specific Bill of Rights guarantees). 
77. This policy applies even to autopsies in the absence of unusual circumstances or informed 
consent from kin. See, e.g., Wilensky v. Greco, 74 Misc. 2d 512, 512-13, 344 N.Y.S.2d 77, 78 (Sup. 
Ct. 1973) (Orthodox Jewish parents of deceased enjoined autopsy); Gurganious v. Simpson, 213 N.C. 
613, 615-16, 197 S.E. 163, 163-64 (1938) (coroner liable for performing autopsy without consent of 
parents of deceased). 
78. See supra notes 4 & 15 (requirements of informed consent for invasive medical procedures). 
79. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 737-38, 370 
N.E.2d 417, 423 (1977) (use of measures to prolong life may isolate family from loved one). 
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III. STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS WITH PAST REFORM PROPOSALS 
Major proposals for reform would still impede individual choice in no- 
code decisions. Generalized, objective tests cannot satisfactorily approxi- 
mate the subjective wishes of individual patients: hospital policies vary 
greatly and are largely unenforceable; probate courts and hospital ethics 
committees can neither accommodate large numbers of cases nor provide 
the requisite monitoring; and living wills have only a limited ability to 
ascertain and preserve the choices of patients. 
A. Current Hospital Policies 
Hospital policies vary broadly in procedures required for no-code deci- 
sions.80 It is apparently uncommon for a hospital policy to state explicitly 
that a physician should obtain informed consent from a competent, termi- 
nally ill patient prior to assigning a no-code status.8' Moreover, no known 
hospital policy requires a physician to obtain informed consent for resusci- 
tation of all competent patients who are at substantial risk of a cardi- 
opulmonary arrest. Finally, where formal policies and procedures for no- 
coding do exist, lack of monitoring systems renders such policies largely 
unenforceable. 
If a patient opposes any in-hospital treatments, he may choose to leave 
the hospital "against medical advice."88 The inflexibility of choice, how- 
80. Accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals does not currently re- 
quire no-code policies. See JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF Hosps., ACCREDITATION MAN- 
UAL FOR HOSPITALS 184-88 (1982) (requirements for special care units). Unaccredited community 
hospitals are not subject to accreditation requirements. 
Some of the more sophisticated hospital policies regarding no-coding, which generally originate in 
university-affiliated hospitals, have been published in the medical literature. None, however, requires 
that a physician anticipate a probable cardiopulmonary arrest by asking the patient about coding 
status. Furthermore, no published hospital policy requires informed consent to fully code any patient. 
All hospital policies allow physicians to obtain no-coding consent as they please. See, e.g., General 
Care Comm. of the Mass. Gen. Hosp., Optimum Carefor Hopelessly Ill Patients, 295 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 362, 362-63 (1976) (physician determines treatment category and may voluntarily request ad- 
vice from Optimum Care Committee); Miles, Cranford & Schultz, The Do-Not-Resuscitate Order in 
a Teaching Hospital, 96 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 660, 660-62 (1982) (how, if at all, to obtain 
consent ultimately left to physician's judgment); Rabkin, Gillerman, & Rice, Orders Not to Resusci- 
tate, 295 NEw ENG. J. MED. 364, 365 (1976) (physician obtains informed consent from either patient 
or family). 
81. An unpublished American Bar Association study surveying northern California hospitals 
shows that hospital policies rarely state such a requirement explicitly. The study probably includes 
more progressive hospitals than would a nation-wide sample, and therefore is biased in favor of in- 
cluding stricter requirements of informed consent for no-codes. Telephone interview with Dr. Joanne 
Lynn, Staff Physician on the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine 
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (Nov. 15, 1982) (notes on file with Yale LawJournal). 
82. None of the published hospital policies has an active monitoring system, outside of advisory 
committees. See supra note 80. 
83. See, e.g., United States v. Iverson, 588 F.2d 194, 194 (5th Cir. 1979) (paranoid schizophrenic 
convicted of assault occurring a few hours after leaving against medical advice); Williams v. United 
States, 450 F. Supp. 1040, 1041 (D.S.D. 1978) (Veterans Administration hospital held negligent for 
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ever, forces the patient either to undergo resuscitation against his will 
while in the hospital or to suffer an unnecessary risk of a shortened life- 
span by leaving needed medical facilities.84 
B. Hospital Ethics Committees and Probate Courts 
Court decisions have equated the requirements for informed consent in 
terminations of life-maintenance technology and in no-code decisions.86 
This reasoning would logically lead to the adoption of the procedure man- 
dated by the Quinlan court: the hospital ethics committee would make 
every initial decision, based upon the physician's and family's recommen- 
dations.86 Other courts, however, have recommended using probate courts 
to sanction life-terminating decisions either by patients or by their 
guardians.87 
allowing murderer to sign out against medical advice without warning police); Kirk v. Common- 
wealth, 186 Va. 839, 844, 44 S.E.2d 409, 411 (1947) (husband allowed to sign out schizophrenic wife 
against medical advice). 
84. Furthermore, hospitals and physicians have not uniformly adopted formal discharge proce- 
dures, and no standardized monitoring devices exist to check against abuses or imposed biases. See 
Schlauch, Reich & Kelly, Leaving the Hospital Against Medical Advice, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 23 
(1979) (poor, single, black patients left against medical advice in disproportionately high numbers); 
Smith, Discharge Against Medical Advice from an Acute Care Private Psychiatric Hospital, 38 J. 
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 550, 550 (1982) (noting correlation of numbers of patients allowed to leave 
against medical advice with particular attending physician). Patients may also be ill-informed of the 
risks that they incur if they do sign out against medical advice. Initiation of a patient advocacy pro- 
gram reduces the rate of hospital discharges against medical advice. See Targum, Capodanno, Hoff- 
man & Fourdraine, An Internention to Reduce the Rate of Hospital Discharges Against Medical 
Advice, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 657, 657 (1982). Finally, patients who are nonambulatory or with- 
out community social support, including caring relatives or economic backing, may be precluded from 
exercising the option of leaving the hospital. See, e.g., R. BURT, supra note 11, at 9-10 (blind and 
nonambulatory burn patient, David G.). 
85. See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Med. Center, 421 A.2d 1334, 1343-50 (Del. 1980) (failing 
to distinguish between removal of respirator and no-code order); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 29, 355 
A.2d 647, 663 (analogizing respirator removal decision to no-code decision), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 92 
(1976). 
86. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 55, 355 A.2d 647, 672, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 92 (1976). The 
Quinlan court was confronted with a patient in a "chronic persistent vegetative state" who nonethe- 
less did not meet brain death criteria. See Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654. Relying upon the 
medical experts' belief that death would likely occur if physicians removed the artificial respiratory 
support, see id. at 25, 355 A.2d at 655, the Quinlan court vested decisionmaking authority in a 
hospital ethics committee as a means of diffusing responsibility and as a monitoring mechanism 
against any improper motives by the family or physician, see id. at 49-51, 355 A.2d at 668-69. The 
court acknowledged the present legal assumption that no-code decisionmaking fits within the Quinlan 
paradigm. See id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663 (finding no distinction between decisions involving life- 
sustaining and those involving resuscitation technologies). Unlike traditional informed consent princi- 
ples, the Quinlan paradigm applies to incompetent patients. See id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664 (noting 
patient unable to exercise choice because incompetent). An exception to the Quinlan paradigm is 
where rare neurologic diseases may destroy respiratory functions but leave intact intellectual func- 
tions, as in the case of a man who suffered from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 
362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (allowing patient to consent to removal of respirator), 
aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980). 
87. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 756-59, 
370 N.E.2d 417, 433-35 (1977) (proposing that denial of life-prolonging treatment should be made 
initially by probate courts); In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 476-77, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 550 (1980) 
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There are, however, material structural elements distinguishing the re- 
moval of life-maintenance technology from no-code decisions. First, no- 
code decisions occur more frequently88 and may overwhelm a procedural 
system unable to accommodate a large number of cases. Second, if a phy- 
sician is unable to obtain a no-code decision, he can use subterfuges not 
available in the decision to remove life-maintenance technologies, such as 
transferring the patient to a facility that lacks CPR teams,89 running a 
minimal CPR effort,90 and using unwritten or erasable coding systems."' 
The monitoring of no-code decisionmaking must therefore be administra- 
tively uncumbersome, or physicians will resort to subterfuges. Hospital 
ethics committees and probate courts, however, are both cumbersome92 
and passive.93 Third, no-code decisions require an immediate judgment, 
while decisions to remove life-sustaining devices are subject to less urgent 
time restraints. The decision not to resuscitate must be made in advance of 
the unpredictable timing of a cardiopulmonary arrest.94 Once a patient is 
already on life-maintenance technologies, however, time for deliberation 
exists.95 
(recommending probate hearing after appointed guardian and committee of doctors certify that the 
patient is in terminal condition), modified sub nom. Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 
64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981). 
88. A coding decision is made, implicitly or explicitly, for every patient who enters a hospital. By 
contrast, physicians rarely place patients on life-maintenance technologies. See Chipman, Adelman & 
Sexton, Criteria for Cessation of CPR in the Emergency Department, 10 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 
11, 16 (1981) (determining that incidence of severe brain damage with coma among successful resusci- 
tations averages five per cent). 
89. See In re Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 704, 713, 434 N.E.2d 601, 605, 610 (1982) (transfer to 
foster home equivalent to assigning no-code order, because foster parents unable to get child to hospi- 
tal in time for resuscitation); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 467 n.1, 380 N.E.2d 134, 135 
n.1 (1978) (most nursing homes lack CPR teams). 
90. See Baer, supra note 12, at 1065 (physician advocating five-minute resuscitation attempts on 
all patients over the age of 65). 
91. See supra note 33 (describing erasable and unwritten coding systems). 
92. Committees are cumbersome because of the delay in assembling decisionmakers and in reach- 
ing a reasoned decision. The courts, of course, generally have an ultimate decisionmaker, in the form 
of a judge, at hand. Nonetheless, the parties must find attorneys, and the attorneys must familiarize 
themselves with the case. 
93. Because both ethics committees and courts depend upon the parties to bring the controversy 
before the decisionmaker, they are inherently passive institutions. 
94. A cardiopulmonary arrest may occur with little warning. See K. ISSELBACHER, R. ADAMS, E. 
BRAUNWALD, R. PETERSDORF & J. WILSON, HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE (9th 
ed. 1980) (describing sudden deaths from cardiovascular collapse). 
95. Indeed, physicians and families seek removal of life-sustaining devices mainly because of the 
long-term prospects of patients who continue to need them. The prognosis of a comatose patient 
incrementally dims with passing time, while intensive-care costs mount. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N 
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RE- 
SEARCH, DEFINING DEATH 96-97 (1981) (summarizing studies of outcomes of comatose patients); cf, 
e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 25-26, 355 A.2d 647, 655 (describing chronic intensive care unit 
treatment with little likelihood of restoration to cognitive life), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re 
Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431. 436-37, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 524 (1980) (comatose patient in intensive-care 
unit with little sign of gaining consciousness), modified sub nom. Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 
438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981). 
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Finally, no-code systems implicitly involve all patients, whereas Quin- 
lan-type procedures involve only incompetent patients.98 If the individual 
desires of a patient are of paramount concern, third-party decisionmaking 
by the hospital committee or probate court is therefore less necessary in 
no-code decisions, since the vast majority of admitted hospital patients are 
competent. 
C. Living Wills 
Living wills are signed documents in which a person requests that his 
life not be unnecessarily prolonged if he becomes terminally ill.97 Thirteen 
states and the District of Columbia have passed "natural death acts"98 
acknowledging the legitimacy of living wills. Living wills cannot, however, 
combine sufficient flexibility with enough specificity to incorporate neces- 
sary procedural safeguards. An unpredictable medical condition may, by 
itself, have such a significant impact on a patient's decision so as to make 
every real circumstance sui generis.99 Social and economic situations may 
change rapidly in a medical crisis. Because living wills depend upon vol- 
untary advance initiation by the individual patient without solicitation by 
the physician, they cannot have the necessary comprehensive scope in 
influencing all coding decisions.'00 
96. Karen Quinlan's brain was damaged in the areas controlling cognition and respiration, but 
not in the region controlling internal body regulation. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 24-25, 355 A.2d 
647, 654-55, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). But cf. supra note 86 (rare neurological diseases 
leaving intact intellectual functions but destroying respiratory functions). 
97. There are generally other restrictions on the sort of treatment which the patient may refuse. 
The refused medical measures must usually serve only to prolong life. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ? 39- 
4504 (Supp. 1982) (living will applies only to procedures that merely prolong moment of death); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ? 449.610 (1977) (limiting application to when death is imminent). Children, in- 
competents, or pregnant women generally may not make living wills. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
16, ? 2502(a) (Supp. 1982) (limiting applicability to competent adults); KAN. STAT. ANN. ? 65- 
28,103 (1979) (prohibiting enforcement of written declaration if patient pregnant). As with conven- 
tional wills, the presence of a certain number of witnesses may be necessary. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ? 
22-8A-4(a) (Supp. 1982) (requiring that witnesses be two non-relatives at least 19 years old); CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ? 7188 (West Supp. 1982) (requiring that witnesses include two non- 
relatives who may not be health providers). 
98. See ALA. CODE ?? 22-8A-1 to -10 (Supp. 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. ?? 82-3801 to -3804 
(Supp. 1981); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ?? 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1982); D.C. CODE ANN. 
?? 6-2401 to -2430 (Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, ?? 2501-2509 (Supp. 1982); IDAHO 
CODE ?? 39-4501 to -4508 (Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. ?? 65-28,101 to -28,109 (1979); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ?? 449.540-.690 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. ?? 24-7-1 to -11 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
?? 90-320 to -322 (Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. ?? 97.050-.085 (1977) (amended 1979); TEX. REV. 
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, ?? 5251-5262 (Supp. 
1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ?? 70.122.010-.905 (Supp. 1982). 
99. See Van Scoy-Mosher, supra note 11, at 15 (acknowledging difficulty in foreseeing circum- 
stances surrounding one's death). One's social and economic condition may change dramatically with 
illness as well. 
100. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 n.36 (D.C. Cir.) (noting that physician must 
volunteer information because confusion or fear often inhibits patients), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 
(1972). By the time the patient realizes that death is a possible outcome, it may be too late to begin 
the process required to write a living will. 
378 
No-Code Decisionmaking 
IV. TOWARD PATIENT CONTROL OVER NO-CODE DECISIONMAKING 
This Note proposes a model consistent with the previously discussed 
structural considerations. Choices exist for both the competent terminally 
ill and the non-terminally ill patient. All patients should determine their 
own coding status at the time of hospital admission. Clear disclosure stan- 
dards and the use of monitoring systems, including second medical opin- 
ions and review by patient advocates, will facilitate preservation of patient 
choice. Courts will need to restructure liability rules to incorporate the 
proposed changes in medical decisionmaking. 
A. Recognizing That Choices Exist 
Contrary to the current medical community presumption that non- 
terminally ill patients should never be assigned no-code status, the Note 
proposes that all competent patients should retain the choice to receive a 
no-code status after hearing an informed appraisal of their prognoses, the 
nature of CPR procedures, and the risks and benefits of resuscitation. Pa- 
tients should be allowed to decide that the risks and benefits of heroic 
resuscitation efforts do not justify the intervention, because the patients 
can best take into account the quality of their own lives and the benefits 
and disadvantages of prolonging their existence should they suffer a cardi- 
opulmonary arrest in the hospital.101 
On the other hand, terminally ill patients should not be no-coded 
against their will. Prolonging life should remain an alternative, even if 
one with little hope.102 An individual may earnestly be awaiting an ex- 
pected future event, such as the birth of a grandchild, and might be will- 
ing to bear all possible costs in hopes of living long enough to experience 
this last joy. The knowledge that one has a terminal illness may also affect 
an individual's consent to treatments as well as to the coding decision.108 
If informed consent is to have substantive meaning, courts should require 
disclosure of the determination that a patient is terminally ill.1?4 
101. See supra pp. 371-72, 
102. This is contrary to the present judicial presumption that there is no choice available for the 
terminally ill patient with an irreversible condition. See, e.g., In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 
466, 474-75, 380 N.E.2d 134, 138-39 (1978) (describing medical situation of no hope or chance); In 
re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 47-48, 355 A.2d 647, 667-68 (describing no treatment as only choice for 
dying patients), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
103. In effect, this Note proposes that in addition to requiring disclosure of risks, nature of proce- 
dures, and available alternatives, physicians should also be required to disclose a patient's prognosis. 
Without knowledge of present prognosis, evaluation of future risks is less meaningful. The patient 
may wish to forego a procedure or treatment that would provide only temporary success. 
104. Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 284-85 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (not- 
ing defendant's consent to police search cannot be meaningful choice unless he knew in fact that he 
could exclude police); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464-65 (1966) (holding that defendant 
cannot make free and knowing choice to remain silent under Fifth Amendment because of police 
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B. Eliciting the Patient's Decision 
Merely answering a patient's questions does not satisfy a physician's 
duty to disclose.10 Physicians must directly inquire about a patient's feel- 
ings regarding coding status after fully informing him about CPR mea- 
sures. Clarity and specificity safeguard both the patient's and the physi- 
cian's interests in decisionmaking. Obtaining every patient's consent upon 
admission to the hospital would allow more time for deliberation and en- 
sure that consent is obtained before the patient becomes incompetent. 
An attending physician should also clearly document. the nature of the 
patient's illness and prognosis as well as the patient's desires after his 
physician has given him a reasonably thorough appraisal of CPR mea- 
sures.1" The physician should repeat this procedure whenever the pa- 
tient's medical condition changes materially.107 Physicians and the other 
hospital staff members should clearly document all resuscitation efforts, as 
well as the circumstances of in-hospital deaths. The chief of the medical 
department should routinely review these reports. 
For incompetent patients, waiting for a probate court to appoint a 
guardian may not be feasible if cardiopulmonary arrest occurs shortly af- 
ter admission. It may therefore be necessary to appoint a guardian ex ante 
for such occasions'" or to make the designation on the basis of the nearest 
kin.109 Such a solution avoids the difficulty present in living wills of hav- 
ing to anticipate all possible situations.110 Modifications to the proposed 
failure to inform of rights). 
105. See supra p. 370. 
106. A clear, unambiguous coding determination on the front of the patient's medical chart is 
necessary to alert all hospital personnel who must react immediately should a cardiopulmonary arrest 
occur. Such a record would also facilitate monitoring by physicians and patient advocates who later 
review that record. 
107. The proximity of the choice of coding assignment to the cardiopulmonary arrest is important. 
Cf. Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 378-80, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274 (1981) 
(patient's statement of desires in close proximity to operation is highly probative of choice not to have 
life prolonged). The decision by a competent patient remains in force if incompetency ensues prior to 
the cardiopulmonary arrest, because the original choice was based on an informed evaluation of possi- 
ble contingencies, including the possibility that incompetency would precede a cardiopulmonary arrest. 
108. See Van Scoy-Mosher, supra note 11, at 16 (recommending that everyone have a guardian). 
109. A designation on a basis that uses an established hierarchy avoids confusion if multiple fam- 
ily members are available for consent. There may be an exception to the nearest-kin designation when 
the spouse has initiated divorce proceedings against the patient. 
110. A guardian, familiar with the patient's personality and lifestyle, may be the individual best 
suited to choose what the patient would have desired. Additionally, the guardian's decision may have 
special legitimacy directly derived from an appointment by the patient for these particular purposes. 
See, e.g., In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 439, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 526 (1980) (fellow priest closest 
companion familiar with patient priest's wishes), modified sub nom. Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 
363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981); In re Storar, 106 Misc. 2d 880, 885, 433 N.Y.S.2d 
388, 393 (Sup. Ct.) (accepting fact that adult patient's mother was sensitive to his needs), aff'd, 78 
A.D.2d 1013, 434 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 
N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981). 
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procedure may be necessary when the patient is a child"'1 or a pregnant 
woman.112 
C. Preserving a Patient's Choice 
To reduce the possibility of judgmental error or even personal bias,"-8 a 
second attending physician's concurrence with the nature of the illness and 
the prognosis should be required before an assignment of a no-code sta- 
tus.114 To encourage independent responsibility, this physician should be 
held jointly and severally liable for negligence in this evaluation. The peer 
review by a second physician adds an element of monitoring to the no- 
111. Children should be assigned a full-code status based upon their best interests if it is signifi- 
cantly likely that CPR will result in a life without serious mental and physical disabilities. See, e.g., 
Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp. Unit, 278 F. Supp. 488, 497-98 (W.D. Wash. 1967) 
(ordering blood transfusions for child against parental religious objections), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 
(1968); People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 625, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773 (ordering blood 
transfusions for anemic child), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); In re Sampson, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 901, 
278 N.E.2d 918, 918-19, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687 (1972) (per curiam) (overruling parental objections 
to anticipated blood transfusions during surgery); cf. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 95-96 (1979) (describing unpublished court decision that al- 
lowed adult mother to choose death, while requiring treatment for her newborn). 
Parents need not surrender their parental autonomy if the dying child's life would only be pro- 
longed for a short time during which a normal quality of life would be impossible. See, e.g., 
Schowalter, Ferholt & Mann, The Adolescent Patient's Decision to Die, 51 PEDIATRICS 97, 97-98 
(1973) (describing teenager with irreversible kidney disease who was allowed to die by abstaining 
from life-extending hemodialysis treatments). No-coding a child should require informed consent by 
the parents. A child's rejection of life-saving treatment therefore cannot represent a truly informed 
consent. Mature emancipated minors should be allowed to determine their coding status based upon 
their own individual desires. An emancipated minor is generally defined as economically independent, 
not living with parents, and having parents who have surrendered their parental duties and rights. See 
A. HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE, 139-41 (1977). 
112. Pregnancy adds an additional dimension to the issues of no-coding. The state's interest in 
protecting fetal life after viability may require a CPR effort on the mother with institution of life- 
support systems until a Caesarean section is performed. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 386, 
388 (1979) (state interest becomes compelling when fetus attains viability). But a woman's interest in 
her privacy and bodily integrity outweigh medical interests in invasions on behalf of a nonviable fetus. 
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973) (holding that state may intervene in abortion decision 
in second trimester of pregnancy only to protect health and safety of pregnant woman). Although fetal 
viability may occur earlier than 28 weeks of gestation, see Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 
(1979) (noting fetal viability usually exists at 28 weeks, but may occur at 24 weeks), this is not true in 
most cases, and it is impossible to make individual determinations without invading the woman's 
body. Viability is defined by the fetus's ability to survive outside the mother's body. See Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973). Hence, the state should not interfere with a pregnant woman's informed 
no-code decision prior to the 28th week of pregnancy. In the second trimester, chances for fetal sur- 
vival increase dramatically if life support systems of a brain-dead mother can be maintained for an 
additional one to three weeks to attain the twenty-seventh week of gestation. See Dillon, Lee, Tro- 
nolone, Buckwald & Foote, Life Support and Maternal Brain Death During Pregnancy, 248 J. 
A.M.A. 1089 (1982) (presenting two case studies of brain-dead pregnant women). Physicians should 
therefore obtain informed consent from the mother, unless already incompetent, for CPR and life 
support measures in anticipation of this possibility. 
113. See supra note 48. 
114. Accuracy of diagnosis and prognosis is crucial to the no-code decision. Cf In re Quinlan, 70 
N.J. 10, 51, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (prognosis is focal point of decision to remove life support), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Even if the prognosis is unclear, the ambiguity of prognosis is neverthe- 
less an important factor for the patient to consider. 
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code decision without resort to more complex bureaucratic approaches, 
such as committee reviews, which probably cannot in any case guarantee 
perfect accountability."" Clarification of procedures by itself functions to 
limit abuse. 
A patient advocate, preferably with a nurse's training,116 should also 
screen all involved medical charts within twenty-four hours after the phy- 
sician certifies that the necessary conditions exist for a no-code assign- 
ment. The patient advocate should also review no-code orders on a regular 
basis. A patient should be able to rescind a no-code order at any time. 
D. Changing Legal Liability Rules 
Courts should award a substantial minimum amount of tort damages, 
based on a cause of action in battery,117 to the plaintiff for violation of 
human dignity if physicians attempt to resuscitate him without obtaining 
his informed consent reasonably soon after his admission to the hospi- 
tal.118 If the patient consents to a full-code status, however, there is in 
effect an assumption of risk for resulting medical and emotional costs that 
may result from a CPR effort,11 unless there is negligence in the CPR 
performance. Failure to honor a full-code decision or failure to obtain 
informed consent for a no-code assignment should result in civil120 or even 
115. Cf. G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, supra note 73, at 189 (monitoring of decentralized medi- 
cal decisions generally relies on physician professionalism and an informal system of peer review). 
116. Nurses are ideal patient advocates because their training incorporates sophisticated medical 
knowledge with a high degree of patient contact. Nurses, as advocates, may have a viewpoint and 
identity apart from physicians. See generally H. FEIFEL, NEW MEANINGS OF DEATH 135-40 (1977) 
(commenting on possible important roles of nurses in caring for the dying); B. HUTTMANN, THE 
PATIENT'S ADVOCATE (1981) (nurse author describing techniques of patient advocacy). 
117. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, I THE LAW OF TORTS ? 3.2, at 213 (1956) (battery theory 
protects physical integrity from harm and freedom from offensive bodily contact). The plaintiff need 
only prove nonconsensual bodily invasion. See Plant, An Analysis of "Informed Consent," 36 FORD- 
HAM L. REV. 639, 657-58 (1968). If informed consent to be fully coded is not obtained, and CPR 
measures are performed, a substantial minimum compensation for battery should be awarded as well. 
Cf. Goldstein, supra note 7, at 691 (reduction of patient's power of choice is a harm to his dignity 
even if same decision would be made and no physical injury incurred). But cf. Canterbury v. Spence, 
464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir.) (using negligence and determining causality by what a prudent person 
in patient's position would have decided if suitably informed), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); 
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 244-46, 502 P.2d 1, 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515-16 (1972) (using 
same objective test); Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 190-91, 354 P.2d 670, 673 (1960) (requiring 
that plaintiff establish that she would not have taken treatments if informed). 
118. This substantial minimum amount of tort damages must be sufficient to compensate the 
plaintiff for the costs of litigation as well as to discourage coding violations. Proof of negligence is not 
a requirement for battery. Strict liability forces the hospital and physicians to bear the costs of all 
accidents, because they are in the best position to reduce the costs of accidents and the costs of accident 
prevention. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26-31 (1977) (describing principal func- 
tion of accident law as the reduction of the sum of accident costs and costs of avoiding accidents). 
119. Cf. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 450 (1971) (describing application of assumption of risks 
if choice is voluntary and free). 
120. While withholding medical treatment does not constitute battery, there may be a violation of 
a physician's duty of care if abandonment occurs. See In re Spring, 80 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1209, 1218, 
405 N.E.2d 115, 122 (1980). 
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criminal penalties.121 The proposed system more sharply defines these lia- 
bility rules compared to the present system, which suffers from 
nonuniformity and a lack of explicitly defined coding procedures. The 
clarity of these proposed rules would provide adequate notice to potential 
violators.122 
CONCLUSION 
This Note urges a more honest and accountable treatment of a patient's 
desires. The values of self-determination and autonomy should not dimin- 
ish in importance with the approach of death. Failure to honor these val- 
ues renders the competent patient incompetent through lack of knowledge 
and robs the patient of human dignity through lack of choice. The dying 
patient should determine what is precious, whether it be a heroic inter- 
vention or an acknowledgment of privacy and bodily integrity. 
-Dean M. Hashimoto 
121. See supra note 63 (criminal prosecutions of physicians). 
If a tort victim requests a no-code status and subsequently dies from the previously sustained inju- 
ries, the actions of the tortfeasor remain the proximate cause of the victim's death. This is similar to 
the tortfeasor's liability for further injuries from medical malpractice. See, e.g., Modave v. Long Is- 
land Jewish Med. Center, 501 F.2d 1065, 1072 (2d Cir. 1974) (acknowledging that negligent driver 
normally liable for hospital malpractice injury to accident victim); Lebesco v. Southeastern Penn. 
Transp. Auth., 251 Pa. Super. 415, 422-23, 380 A.2d 848, 852 (1977) (noting that tortfeasor liable 
for additional injury from unskillful medical treatment). The same is true if a crime victim requests a 
no-code status. Cf., e.g., In re J.N., 406 A.2d 1275, 1279 (D.C. App. 1979) (discontinuing life sup- 
port system of patient does not amount to intervening cause of death); People v. Gulliford, 86 Ill.. 
App. 3d 237, 241, 407 N.E.2d 1094, 1097-98 (1980) (nontreatment for pneumonia not supervening 
cause of death); Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 256, 366 N.E.2d 744, 749-50 (1977) 
(disconnection of respirator not proximate cause of death of patient). 
122. Cf Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 633, 470 P.2d 617, 626, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 490 
(1970) (holding that fetal killing not murder because due process requires clear notice for changes in 
definition of homicide); In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 451, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 533 (1980) (discussing 
legal need for notice by allowing advanced prosecution in determination of whether withdrawal of 
treatment constitutes homicide), rnodified sub nom. Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 
438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981). 
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